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FINTECH AND RACE-BASED
INEQUALITY IN THE HOME

MORTGAGE AND AUTO FINANCING
MARKETS
Winnie F. Taylor*
INTRODUCTION
The racial gap in wealth in the United States is astonishing.
A 2019 survey found that the typical White family has eight times
the wealth of the typical African American family and five times
the wealth of the typical Hispanic family.1 Unfortunately, discrimination in the home mortgage market and the lending industry has
contributed greatly to the inequality of wealth gap by limiting
wealth accumulation opportunities for racial minorities. The magnitude of economic loss that racial minorities experience from discrimination in mortgage lending is exemplified in a recent study by
researchers at the University of California, Berkeley (the "Berkeley
Study").2 These researchers tested home loans for the presence of
racial discrimination and estimated its levels in home mortgage

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This essay is based in part on ideas
expressed in my previous scholarship on the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and
racial discrimination in consumer credit. I thank Julia Cummings and Colleen
Cummings for their excellent research assistance. I also thank the Brooklyn
Law School faculty research fund for its support. I dedicate this essay to Dr. Joe
Copes, my mentor and enduring inspiration.
Neil Bhutta et al., Disparitiesin Wealth by Race andEthnicity in the 2019
Survey of Consumer Finances, BD. GOVERNORS FED. REs. Sys., (last updated
Sept. 28, 2020) https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-race-and-ethnicity-in-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm.
2 See Robert Bartlett et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the
FinTech Era (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25943,
2019).
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credit, the largest consumer-lending market for lenders.3 Their
findings show that fintech and traditional lenders charged otherwise equal Latinx and African American borrowers higher interest
rates than White borrowers for purchase and refinanced mortgages, costing the minority borrowers $765 million yearly, for the
same product. 4
Fintech describes a diverse group of nonbank companies
that use digital technology to modernize and simplify both the provision of financial services and the customer experience in interfacing with financial services providers. Advances in electronic
systems are eliminating time and space restrictions on the delivery
of financial services, lowering the cost for some innovative products, and providing the incentive for newly emerging companies to
offer financial products on a highly competitive basis. In short, as
stated by one influential observer of financial market trends, the
new digital technology unlocks new possibilities for fully frictionless transacting.
By making financial transactions infinitely
faster, easier, and cheaper, fintech lenders also offer new opportunities for financial inclusion and expanded access to financial services.6 While fintech tools have great potential to deliver a wide
range of analytically grounded financial services and simplified
choices that can benefit racial minorities, they also have the potential to deprive individuals and communities of color of significant
wealth accumulation. Although the Berkeley Study shows that the
fintech lenders discriminated forty percent less than traditional
lenders in the pricing of home loans, it is important to point out
that this level of racial discrimination is still intolerable.' By using
algorithmic mechanisms and data analytics to make their lending
decisions, fintech innovations are poised to amplify the racial
wealth gap. The worry is that as fintech firms continue to grow
and eventually overtake the financial services industry, the racial
wealth gap will become even wider given that home ownership is
the primary source of wealth for most Americans.' The additional
3 Id
4 Id
5 See Saule T.

Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic

Phenomenon, 36 YALE
6 Id

J. ON REGUL. 735, 745 (2019).

' See Bartlett, supra note 2.
8 See ERIC BELSKY & JOEL PRAKKEN, HOUSING WEALTH EFFECTS:
HOUSING'S IMPACT ON WEALTH ACCUMULATION, WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
AND CONSUMER SPENDING, JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUD. (2004),

https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/w04-13.pdf.
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concern is that fintech credit assessment tools will make it more
difficult for consumers to prove race-based lending discrimination
claims in the home mortgage market and beyond. The automobile
financing market is especially noteworthy because unabated discrimination in this market may also have a deleterious effect on
wealth accumulation of racial minorities. It is thus imperative that
policymakers acknowledge and prioritize racial discrimination in
fintech firms as an urgent problem requiring prompt legislative
and law enforcement attention.
The Berkeley Study findings show that although fintech
lenders reduced biases by removing face-to-face interactions, their
lending assessment tools nevertheless produced worrisome statistical discrimination that disproportionately impacted racial minorities.9 To be sure, both human judgment bias and statistical discrimination impede opportunities for racial minorities to
accumulate wealth and otherwise advance economically. But under current fair lending law, race-based, disparate impact discrimination claims in consumer lending are difficult to prove, if allowed
to be litigated at all.10 And yet given the proliferation of fintech
firms with their ability to produce racially disparate outcomes, statistical discrimination will eventually become the dominant form
of racial discrimination that exists in American society. Faced
with this potentiality, policymakers should unequivocally endorse
impact theory as a necessary methodology for proving lending discrimination claims and clarify how impact proof standards can be
met.
The purpose of this essay is to stimulate and add to the discussion regarding the need for lawmakers to mitigate potential racial discrimination in fintech algorithmic consumer lending. It
questions whether the vast array of data included in fintech algorithms will increase proof difficulties for plaintiffs who litigate
race-based, disparate impact lending discrimination claims. Furthermore, it argues that proof difficulties present the ultimate challenge to achieving racial justice in consumer credit transactions because if this challenge is not met, price inequities will likely
continue to economically devastate individuals and communities
of color as they navigate the fintech marketplace. The essay is not
intended to provide definitive answers to the racial discrimination
questions fintech lending raises. Rather, its purpose is to shed light
on why it is important that legislatures and fair lending
9

See Bartlett, supra note 2.
infra Part VI.

10 See
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enforcement officials consider in greater depth the problem of discriminatory algorithms and their effects on racial minorities. The
home mortgage and automobile loan markets are highlighted to
explore the concerns raised in this essay because houses and cars
are likely to be the two most expensive assets consumers will own.
The essay proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief historical overview of how the home mortgage policies and practices
of the federal government and traditional banks contributed to the
current racial wealth gap. Part II explains how traditional lenders
make their credit decisions. This Part provides a backdrop for
comparing traditional lender decision making with fintech credit
assessment tools, which are discussed in Part III. Part III describes
algorithmic scoring systems that fintech firms use to make their
lending decisions and demonstrates why policymakers must scrutinize algorithmic data inputs and the structural design of algorithms to determine if they generate racial disparities. Part IV emphasizes why racial discrimination in fintech lending is an urgent
problem that lawmakers should promptly address. This Part also
analyzes how the problem of discriminatory algorithms exacerbates proof difficulties for plaintiffs who litigate racial discrimination claims based on lending disparities. Part V explores the problem of racial inequity in automobile financing and explains why
lawmakers should address concerns about discriminatory lending
practices in this market with greater nuance than has characterized their efforts to date. Part VI analyzes the problem of proving
lending discrimination claims. As Part VII concludes, this essay
underscores the need for policymakers to critically examine predictive analytics and machine learning decision making with the aim
of eliminating their ability to further deplete the wealth of racial
minorities. Also, at the federal level, the essay urges Congress to
mandate the collection of race data in the automobile finance market so that plaintiffs with race-based discrimination claims against
creditors that provide auto loans can have a realistic chance of
proving their claims under federal fair lending law.
I.

PART I: HISTORICAL RACE-BASED INEQUALITY
IN MORTGAGE LENDING

Racial discrimination in mortgage lending has a long and
varied history that is directly linked to the racial wealth gap. Notably, the federal government has played a key role in erecting racialized home mortgage barriers. For instance, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which President Franklin Roosevelt
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and the U.S. Congress created to help stabilize the economy following the Great Depression, discriminated against racial minorities when it provided mortgage assistance to struggling Americans." Specifically, beginning in the 1930s, the FHA implemented
practices that helped White families obtain home ownership but
failed to similarly help African Americans and other minorities. 2
Thus, by adopting policies that served only White families until
1968, the FHA racialized the housing market and systemically
wrote people of color out of home ownership. 3 Racial exclusion of
minorities from the home mortgage market at the federal level is
also reflected in governmental conduct associated with the GI Bill,
legislation Congress enacted in 1944 to help veterans prosper after
World War 11.14 Although a major part of the GI Bill guaranteed
low interest, home mortgage loans to veterans, White veterans
were the primary beneficiaries of this governmental program." In
sum, for decades, the assistance of the federal government permitted White Americans to accumulate assets through the housing
market. The exclusion of people of color from such home ownership opportunities has had a lasting effect on their wealth portfolios.
" National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
12 See Brian Gilmore, Home is Where the Hatredis: A Proposalfor
a FederalHousingAdministration Truth andReconciliation Commission, 10 U. MD.
L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 249, 263-67 (2010) (giving examples of biased FHA policies, including the policy of giving neighborhoods grades based
upon racial composition).
13

1"
15

Id.

Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-34, 58 Stat. 284.
Florence Wagman Roisman, NationalIngratitude: The Egregious Defi-

ciencies of the United States' HousingProgramsfor Veterans and the "Public
Scandal"of Veterans'Homelessness,38 IND. L. REv. 103, 149 (2005) ("Less than
2 per cent of the housing financed with federal mortgage assistance from 1946
to 1959 was available to [Black Americans]. Moreover, housing financed by the
VA (and FHA) was strictly segregated on the basis of race, so that the few such
homes that were available to non-whites were in non-white neighborhoods.");
Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, The Wealth Gap and the RacialDisparitiesin the
Startup Ecosystem, 62 ST. LoUIs U. L.J. 419, 432 (2018) (noting that local administration of benefits allowed for discrimination); Juan F. Perea, Doctrinesof
Delusion: How the History of the G.I Bill and Other Inconvenient Truths Undermine the Supreme Court'sAffirmative Action Jurisprudence,75 U. PITT. L.
REv. 583, 596 (2014) (although the housing benefits under the GI Bill would've
guaranteed "up to 50% of loans made by private banks and lending institutions
to veterans," most banks would not loan to Black Americans, depriving Black
veterans from reaping the benefits of the legislation).
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Private financial institutions also used tactics that contributed to the race-based wealth gap. Like the FHA, some lenders
practiced "redlining"-the refusal to grant mortgage loans in certain neighborhoods due to the race or ethnicity of the residents who
live there." 16 Other lenders engaged in so called "reverse redlining"
by deliberately seeking out minority borrowers for mortgage
credit." These lenders regularly targeted members of minority
groups for the specific purpose of making toxic loans with grossly
unfair terms and harmful effects.18 During the 2008 financial crisis, many subprime lenders used this tactic to victimize racial minorities. 9 Their unscrupulous conduct resulted in massive foreclosures in minority communities.20 According to Mehrsa Baradaran,
a banking law scholar, the 2008 financial crisis disproportionally
affected Black communities by wiping out fifty-three percent of
total Black wealth. 2
See Gene A. Marsh, Lender Liability for Consumer FraudPracticesof
Retail Dealers and Home Improvement Contractors, 45 ALA. L. REv. 1, .15
(1993) (discussing the historical origin of the term "redlining"); see also United
States v. Decatur Fed. Sav. and Loan Assn., No. 1 92-CV-2198-CAM, P-H: Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rptr.(N.D. Ga. 1992) (regarding consent decrees between
governmental fair lending enforcement agencies and private lenders); United
States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 9-1-1824 JG, P-H: Fair Housing16

Fair Lending Rptr. (D.D.C. 1994); United States v. Albank FSB., C.A. No. 97CV-1206, P-H Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,401 (N.D.N.Y. 1997);
United States v. First Am. Bank, No. 1:04-cv-4585 (N.D. Ill. 2004); United
States
v.
Centier
Bank,
No.
2:06-cv-344
(N.D.
Ind.
2006);

United States v. First Merch. Bank,

No. 1:19-cv-02365-JPH-MPB, 2019 WL

3779768 (S.D. Ind. 2019).
1" "Reverse redlining" is the practice of extending credit on unfair terms to
specific geographic areas due to the income or ethnicity of its residents. See
Linda Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized Consumer
Fraud&Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL'Y 121, 127 (2009) (explaining that the
term "reverse redlining" refers to an inversion of the older practice of "redlining,"
which is the practice of excluding minority neighborhoods altogether from mortgage lending).
18

Id.; see alsoWinnie F. Taylor, EliminatingRacialDiscriminationIn The
&

Subprime Mortgage Market Proposals For Fair Lending Reform, 18 J.L.
POL'Y 263, 274 (2009) (discussing Department of Justice reverse redlining lawsuit against Long Beach Mortgage Company).
19 See Fisher, supra note
17.
20 See DEBBIE BOCIAN ET AL., FORECLOSURES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY

6

(Center for Responsible Lending, 2010).
21

MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE

RACIAL WEALTH GAP 249 (2017).
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Whether discrimination in fintech algorithmic decision
making will likewise cause tremendous economic harm to minority
individuals and communities of color is the concern this essay
raises. To effectively address this concern and ensure that new and
innovative lenders do not fall into the same discriminatory lending
patterns exhibited by traditional banks, policymakers must critically examine the fintech underwriting process. Parts II and III
below briefly explore this component of fintech lending by comparing the fintech decision making process with that of conventional lenders. This comparison illuminates the potential economic
harm that fintech loan underwriting systems pose to racial minorities.

II.

PART II: JUDGMENTAL CREDITWORTHINESS
EVALUATION AND CONVENTIONAL SCORING
SYSTEMS

Judgmental and statistical scoring systems are the two types
of evaluation systems lenders use to determine an applicant's creditworthiness, that is, whether an applicant is a suitable risk for
credit extension.2 2 Judgmental scoring involves a subjective process whereby a credit manager reviews information contained in
an applicant's credit file and thereafter evaluates the applicant's
ability and willingness to repay the loan. Typically, credit managers consider information such as home ownership, credit references, and payment history. After reviewing this information, they
make professional judgments to grant or deny credit, relying in
part on their past experiences as credit risk evaluators.23 Explicit
and implicit racial bias inevitably infects this type of human decision-making process, as the Berkeley Study confirms.2 4
Most lenders have probably abandoned the laborious task
of judgmentally making loan decisions on a case-by-case basis. Instead, they automate decision making by using statistical scoring
systems. Statistical scoring systems employ empirical techniques
to predict the probability that a loan applicant will repay.25 The
FICO credit score is the archetypical automated underwriting
See Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal CreditOpportunity Act's Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 BUFF. L.
REV. 73, 86 (1980).
23 Id. at 86.
24 Bartlett, supra note 2.
2s Taylor, supra note 22, at 88.
22
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predictor. 26 Certain credit-based data such as payment history,
amounts owed, new credit, and types of credit are fed into computers to produce the FICO credit score.2" Unsurprisingly, automated
creditworthiness assessments based primarily on information associated with established credit histories disproportionately exclude
minorities due to historical racial bias. 28
III.

PART III: CREDITWORTHINESS EVALUATION IN
THE FINTECH ERA AND ALGORITHMIC
DECISION MAKING

In the modern lending environment, algorithms and big
data are key components of the underwriting process. In fact,
these features distinguish fintech statistical scoring systems from
conventional credit scoring models. Although "big data" does not
have a uniform definition, it generally refers to the analysis of
large, complex datasets that are collected from numerous sources.29
Importantly, fintech firms do not rely exclusively on credit scores
or credit history data to evaluate credit applicants. Instead, they
employ algorithms that make creditworthiness predictions from
massive combinations of big data acquired from traditional and
nontraditional sources. Nontraditional data sources might include
utility and cell phone bills, as well as rental payments, information
that conventional lenders usually ignore. By drawing on a broader
range of predictive variables than conventional statistical scoring
systems, fintech firms have the potential to make mortgage and
other forms of credit increasingly available to underserved individuals and communities. This is certainly good news for people of
color. But accolades for greater inclusion and accessibility are
greatly diminished by the reality that fintech firms nevertheless
The FICO credit score is a number that represents the creditworthiness
of a person, that is, the likelihood that a person will repay her debts. See generally, Shweta Arya et al., Anatomy of the Credit Score, 95 J. ECON. BEHAV.
ORG. 175, 175 (2013).
27
Id
28
&

26

MATT FELLOWS, CREDIT SCORES AND REPORTS: GETTING
AHEAD IN

AMERICA 9-10 (2006).
29 Big Data: What It
Is and Why It Matters, SAS INSTITUTE INC.,
https://www.sas.com/en-us/insights/big-datalwhat-is-big-data.html (last visited
May 15, 2021) (defining "big data" as a term to describe the "large volume of
data - both structured and unstructured - that inundates a business on a dayto-day basis").
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discriminate in home loan pricing, thereby costing racial minorities
millions, as the Berkeley researchers found. This reality check cautions against fully celebrating fintech lending inclusiveness before
the pricing discrimination issue is squarely addressed.
Why algorithms produce racially disparate outcomes is an
important question. Racialized input data may be the culprit. For
instance, if lenders ask credit applicants for their racial classification and include this information in algorithms, this data would
likely generate biased results. But even when the input data is not
obviously racialized, algorithmic scoring models could produce biased outcomes. As one scholar points out, algorithmic input data
could include proxies for race that might be found in relatively innocuous activities such as web-browsing behavior.3 0 Accordingly,
web searches for historically Black colleges and universities
(HBCUs), Black female judges, or for a notorious Latinx food
brand such as "Goya" might correlate with race and therefore embed racial bias into outcomes if such information is included in algorithmic datasets. Similarly, algorithms that include Facebook
"likes" may contain input data that signal race or ethnicity. In one
fascinating study using Facebook "likes" to determine racial identity, African Americans and White Americans were correctly clas31 Zip code information can
sified in ninety-five percent of cases.
also be associated with race due to the nation's history of segregated housing patterns.3 2 It is therefore important that algorithms
exclude zip codes because they can be used as race proxies for Cau33
casian, African American, and other racial classifications. This
is not to say that fintech algorithmic credit assessments presently
include zip codes or information obtained from tracking consumer
technological devices. The point made here is that algorithms
must be carefully scrutinized because they may contain facially
neutral information that in fact reflects and replicates existing

30

Anupam Chander, The RacistAlgorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1038

(2017).
31 Id. (citing Michael Kosinski ET AL., Private TraitsandAttributesAre Predictable from DigitalRecords of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.

Sci. 5802, 5802 (2013).
32 James A. Kushner, The FairHousingAmendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of FairHousing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 (1989); see
also, Brian J. Connolly, Promise Unfulfilled?Zoning, DisparateImpact, andAffirmatively FurtheringFairHousing, 48 URB. L. 785, 789-96 (2016) (providing
a historical account of past and present segregation in housing).
3"

Chander, supra note 30, at 1038.
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discrimination generated from race proxy data.34 Some scholars
argue that no matter how diligent the effort, it is impossible for
algorithms to exclude all information associated with past discrimination, such as credit history information which historically favors White Americans. They therefore conclude that algorithms
are inherently racist.3 5
Independently of racialized data inputs, proxy or otherwise,
the internal workings of the huge datasets that comprise algorithms may account for the racial disparities they generate. Scholars who hold this view argue that structural flaws in the way algorithms are designed cause biased results. They contend that the
biased results emerge from data that may not in any way appear
to be correlated with race or past discrimination when used alone
but may be highly correlated with race when evaluated in conjunction with other information. 36 Proponents of this view emphasize
that algorithms are designed to make lending decisions from the
amalgamation of huge datasets and that it is this mixture that
causes discriminatory outcomes, not credit analyses that are being
skewed by racial input data." The core of this argument appears
to be that, due to design flaws, algorithms produce racial bias without any impermissible data inputs, which seems to make them insidious discriminators. According to artificial intelligence expert
Frank Pasquale, algorithmic discrimination is indeed deeply troubling because the discrimination "is hidden behind subtle manipulations that are nearly impossible to discern for ordinary citizens
not privy to the internal computer code."38 Pasquale's reference to
coding suggests that an examination of input data will not alone
determine why algorithms produce racial disparities.
That

Chander, supra, note 30, at 1036 (discussing what she calls the problem
of viral discrimination-that algorithms. simply compound the errors of the
past).
3 Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773,
787 (2019); Matthew Adam Bruckner, Fintech'sPromises and Perilsthe Promise and Perils ofAlgorithmic Lenders' Use of Big Data, 93 CHI. KENT L. REv.
3, 29 (2018).
36
Jon Kleinberg ET AL., DiscriminationIn The Age Of Algorithms, 10 J.
"

LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 24 (2018).

" Bruckner, supra note 35, at 29; Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrim-

inationIs an InformationProblem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1404-05 (2019).
3 FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION, 38 (2015).
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determination can only be made by understanding the algorithmic
coding apparatus, that is, understanding how algorithms are built.
Besides racialized data inputs and structural design flaws,
there may be other ideas that explain why algorithms produce racial disparities. Lawmakers should fully explore this topic.

IV.

PART IV: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
FINTECH LENDING: AN URGENT PROBLEM
THAT NEEDS ADDRESSING

Whether algorithms perpetuate past credit bias or generate
their own biased results, it is clear that they can produce racial disparities. The pricing discrimination the Berkeley Study revealed
makes it difficult to ignore the economic risks that fintech firms
pose to racial minorities, despite their potential to make mortgage
credit more inclusive. The ultimate challenge for policymakers in
combatting racial discrimination in fintech lending is to determine
how to sever the harmful aspects and leave intact the beneficial
services. To begin, financial regulators should regard algorithmic
lending discrimination as a systemic problem and develop a holistic plan to address it. The plan should embrace the possibility that
both input data and design flaws contribute to racially discriminatory outcomes in fintech risk assessments. To root out this discrimination, fintech algorithms must be vigilantly studied, monitored,
and analyzed. Hopefully, this vigilance will reveal ways to adjust
the input variables to eliminate any racial discrimination they generate and identify design flaws that can be corrected to achieve equitable results. Admittedly, trying to understand the inner workings of algorithms by opening up their black box structure is likely
to present a formidable challenge to financial regulators. One potential barrier to obtaining greater transparency is the possibility
that algorithmic input data and information about how algorithms
function may be proprietary and subject to trade secret protection
that exempts disclosure.3 9 Legislative action may be required to
make the data available to fair lending officials. Ultimately,
greater transparency is needed to properly examine and monitor
algorithms for racial discrimination, assuming they are not too
complex to understand. The goal of the federal plan should be to
discover ways to detect and eliminate the racially discriminatory
effects of algorithmic credit assessments.
Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparencyfor the
Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 153-54 (2018).
9
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With respect to detecting discrimination, some academic researchers believe that algorithms can be properly constructed to
root out the sources that cause racially disparate outcomes. They
argue that:
[t]o understand how algorithms affect discrimination, we
must understand how they affect detection of discrimination. With the appropriate requirements in place, algorithms create the potential for new forms of transparency
and hence opportunities to detect discrimination that are
This implies algorithms are
otherwise unavailable
not only a threat to be regulated; with the right safeguards, they can be a potential positive for equity.40
Paradoxically, it may be that algorithms themselves hold
the keys to addressing the racially discriminatory effects they produce. Fair lending enforcement officials should explore this possibility. In particular, they should examine and test the effectiveness
of so-called "repair algorithms."4 1 These innovative algorithmic
models are specifically designed to detect racial discrimination in
other algorithmic models.
If effective, repair algorithms and similar innovations
should help regulators address the additional problem that fintech
lending exacerbates, which is the problem of proving race-based
lending discrimination claims. As discussed in Part III, fintech algorithms use big data variables to make their lending decisions. 2
These huge datasets will likely increase the difficulty of pinpointing the specific source of the racial discrimination that emanates
from algorithms, unless innovative detection methods are employed. Fintech lending thus elevates concerns about how to prove
racial discrimination claims.
V.
.

PART V: BRONX HONDA, AUTO FINANCE
DISCRIMINATION, AND MISSING RACE DATA

The extent to which fintech firms can hide illegal racial discrimination by using huge datasets in algorithmic risk assessment
models should be a major concern of racial justice advocates. This
concern should not be confined to home mortgage lending. It also
40

Kleinberg, supranote 36, at 1.

See generally,Michael Feldman et al, CertifyingandRemovingDisparate
Impact (2015), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.3756.pdf.
4
42

See id., Part III.
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arises in the automobile financing industry. Claims of racial discrimination in auto financing merit heightened regulatory attention for several reasons. First, automobiles are the most expensive
assets consumers own, second only to houses.43 Second, over
ninety-five percent of American households report having access
to at least one automobile and most consumers finance their auto
purchases." Third, access to reliable transportation is a vehicle for
higher wages and crucial to the livelihoods of most consumers.45
Legal scholar Pamela Foohey describes the evolving fintech market for auto sales and argues that unless the government steps in
to support consumers in the emerging new "car economy," new innovations will continue to be detrimental to consumers. 46
Discriminatory pricing in the auto loan market is costly and
therefore can cause significant economic harm to racial minorities.
There is growing concern that in the fintech era, creditor reliance
on big data, algorithms, and machine learning to make lending decisions will exacerbate this harm.4 7 One way that fintech auto
lending can harm consumers is by making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prove racial discrimination claims. Proving racial discrimination is especially challenging in litigation involving automobile financing because unlike home mortgage credit, race data
is largely unavailable in nonmortgage credit transactions. The
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) requires home mortgage
lenders to collect race data from borrowers, however, there is no
such collection requirement when consumers seek car loans.48 In

43 See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, & Deborah Thorne, Driven to
Bankruptcy, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 287, 289-90 (2020).
" See Adam Levitin, The Fast and the Usurious:Putting the Brakes on

Auto Lending Abuses, 108 GEO. L. REV. 1257, 1259.
4 Statement
of
FTC
Commissioner
Rohit
Chopra
(2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/15 76002/bronx_honda.
46 Pamela Foohey, Consumers'DecliningPowerin the Fintech Auto Loan
Market, 15 BROOK J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 2 (2020).
" Id. at 2.
*48 See generallyHome Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200
89 Stat. 1125 (1975) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (2006)). Congress enacted
the HMDA in 1975 to address the issue of whether minority borrowers were
denied mortgage loans more frequently than white borrowers and whether those
disparities, if any, reflected discrimination in financial institutions' lending
practices. Winnie F. Taylor, EliminatingRacialDiscriminationin the Subprime
Mortgage Market: Proposalsfor FairLending Reform, 18 J.L. & POL'Y 263
(2009). In 1989, Congress amended the HMDA to require lenders to collect and
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fact, the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits
lenders from obtaining a credit applicant's race.49 I argued in earlier work that Congress should amend the ECOA and thereby
mandate the collection of race data in financed auto purchases because of the persistent claims of discrimination in this nonmortgage credit market, and because of the grave disadvantage ECOA
plaintiffs experience when they attempt to prove race-based lending discrimination claims without this crucial data.50 The inability
to make accurate racial comparisons can be fatal to the plaintiffs'
claims.
The structure of auto loans is an additional reason why financed auto sales are ripe for regulatory scrutiny in the fintech
lending environment. This structure relates to the compensation
arrangement between dealers and indirect lenders that finance
auto purchases. A recent case highlights the potential economic
harm that this arrangement poses to racial minorities. Last year,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against
Liberty Chevrolet, a New York City automobile dealership doing
business under the name "Bronx Honda."5 ' The complaint contained numerous allegations of illegal conduct, including a claim
of racial discrimination in violation of the ECOA. With respect to
the racial discrimination claim, the complaint included the following allegation:
Defendants have instructed sales personnel to charge African American and Hispanic consumers higher markup
and additional fees, leading to higher prices for vehicles.
Defendants have instructed personnel to perform these
practices with African American and Hispanic consumers only, stating that these consumers have limited education. Defendants have told their employees not to attempt these practices with non-Hispanic white
consumers. Defendants also have used derogatory terms
to refer to African American and Hispanic consumersreport information about the race, sex, and income of applicants for home mortgage loans. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003 (1989).

"Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2017).
s See Winnie F. Taylor, Proving Racial Discriminationand Monitoring
FairLending Compliance: The MissingData Problemin Nonmortgage Credit,
31 B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 199 (2011).
51

Complaint, FTC v. Liberty Chevrolet, No. 20-CV-3945 (S.D.N.Y. May

21, 2020) https://www.ftc.gov/system/filrs/documrnts/cases/bronxhonda_com-

plaint. (2020).
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-African American consumers were charged about $163
more in interest than similarly situated non-Hispanic
white consumers, while Hispanic consumers were
charged about $211 more in interest.52
Pursuant to an agreement for Bronx Honda to pay $1.5 million to victims of the dealership's illegal conduct, the case ended
with a settlement in May 2020.5
The compensation scheme in Bronx Honda is widely used
in the auto financing industry. It involves conduct between auto
dealers and auto finance companies whereby dealers make pricingrelated discretionary decisions commonly known as dealer re5
This commission-driven pricing system allows auto dealserves."
ers to mark up the risk-based "buy rate" set by finance companies
that purchase retail installment contracts from dealers." The buy
rate is the lowest acceptable interest rate that a lender will charge
for financing an automobile purchase. Lenders determine the buy
rate by making assessments of customer credit risk. Dealers have
the discretion to charge an interest rate above the lender's buy rate,
ostensibly for their participation in the financing transaction.56 Although the dealership's participation in the markup practice is legal, ECOA enforcement officials have alleged that dealers subjectively make their decisions in a racially discriminatory manner by
charging African Americans and Latinx consumers higher interest
rates than similarly situated nonminority purchasers." Consumer
rights advocates condemn the discretionary markup system

52

See id

ss See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n Auto Dealership Bronx Honda,
General Manager to Pay $1.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges They Discriminated Against African American, Hispanic Car Buyers (May 27, 2020)
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/bronxhondastipulated.
" See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. No. 201392, INDIRECT AUTO LENDING AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUAL CREDIT

http://files.consum(2013),
ACT
OPPORTUNITY
[hereinafter
erfinance.gov/f/2013303_cfpb_march_Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf.

CFPB BULL.].
5 See id
56 See id
" See generally Statement of FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents.public_stateavailable
at
ments/1576006/bronx (2020); see also, CFPB BULL. supra note 54 at 2.
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because they believe it provides perverse incentives for dealers to
unfairly and deceptively charge higher interest rates to consumers. 58

For more than two decades, private parties and ECOA enforcement officials have pursued discrimination claims against
auto finance lenders in which they challenged discretionary
markup systems for their discriminatory effects on racial minorities.59 To compensate for missing race data, these litigants probably use race proxies such as surnames and zip codes to identify the
minority victims of discrimination. 60 Notably, the Bronx Honda.
case is exceptional because the FTC filed its complaint against the
auto dealership itself, instead of the financial institutions that
granted the car loans to consumers.
Also, unlike in the Bronx Honda case, most ECOA plaintiffs who claim racial discrimination in the auto loan market will
not have "smoking gun" evidence of illegal conduct to support their
claims. Apparently, the FTC interviewed Bronx Honda personnel
who were willing to testify that management directed them to
charge African American and Latinx consumers higher interest
rates than their White counterparts for car loans. Direct evidence
that supports claims of intentional racial discrimination is rare. Indeed, in the fintech lending environment, most ECOA plaintiffs
are likely to have even greater difficulty discovering direct evidence of discriminatory intent, either because it does not exist, or
because it is too subtle to detect when algorithms make lending
decisions by processing massive datasets.
Most lawsuits that challenge the compensation arrangement in auto financing as discriminatory will likely focus on the
58 See Center for Responsible Lending, Comments to the Federal Trade
Commission
Motor
Vehicle
Roundtables
6
(Mar.
30,
2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publiccomments/publicroundtables-protecting-consumers-sale-and-leasing-motor-vehicles-proj ect-

no.p104811-00104/00104-82859.pdf.
9 See infra PartVI.
60 Formally, this is known as the Bayesian (BISG) statistical methodology
for determining race and ethnicity and racial disparities. See CONSUMER FIN.

PROT. BUREAU, USING PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION TO PROXY FOR

UNIDENTIFIED RACE AND ETHNICITY 5 (2014), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpbreport_proxy-methodology.pdf; see also Marc N.
Elliot et al., A New Method ForEstimatingRace/EthnicityandAssociatedDisparities Where Administrative Records Lack Self-Reported Race/Ethnicity, 43
HEATH SERV. REs. 1722 (2008) (explaining the use of the BISG method in the
health services industry).
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disparate effects of the loan lending structure on racial minorities.
Discrimination, if it exists, is more difficult to prove in these cases
because usually there is no direct evidence to support racially biased motives. But if litigation is going to be an effective enforcement tool to combat discrimination in auto financing, fair lending
regulators will need sufficient tools to uncover hidden forms of illegal racial discrimination. These regulators must be able to deploy sophisticated means to proactively root out the discrimination
that may be hidden in race proxies or the design structures of predictive technology. They must have alternatives to "smoking gun"
evidence. Comparative race data can provide circumstantial and
statistical evidence that can facilitate proof of racial discrimination
claims. This evidence is particularly valuable at the initial stages
of litigation because it can help establish a prima facie case and
defeat summary judgment motions. As a result, more full-fledged
hearings of race-based lending discrimination claims could be decided on their merits. Congress should mandate the collection of
race data in financed auto purchases so that ECOA enforcement
agencies can become better equipped to protect consumers from
racial discrimination in the fintech lending environment. The next
section discusses an additional legislative proposal.

VI.

PART VI: FINTECH AND THE EQUAL CREDIT
OPPORTUNITY ACT: PROVING DISPARATE
IMPACT CLAIMS

The key federal law plaintiffs are likely to invoke to hold
lenders liable for lending discrimination claims is the ECOA. Congress enacted this legislation in 1974 to eliminate unfair lending
practices on the basis of race, national origin, sex, and other personal attributes. The goal of the ECOA is to ensure equality in the
financial services industry by proscribing consideration of factors
that are unrelated to an applicant's creditworthiness.6 1 The law
proscribes disparate treatment discrimination, which occurs when
lenders treat borrowers differently on an ECOA prohibited basis
such as race.62 The other legal theory that plaintiffs use when litigating ECOA discrimination claims is disparate impact. Disparate
impact discrimination occurs when a lender applies a racially neutral policy or practice equally to all credit applicants, but the policy
or practice disproportionally excludes or burdens certain persons
61
62

Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 12 U.S.C. § 1691 (2017).
Id at § 1691 (a).
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on an ECOA prohibited basis. However, if the policy or practice
is justified by business necessity and there is no less discriminatory
alternative available to financial institutions, then there is no violation of the ECOA.63 Unlike the Bronx Honda case, most credit
discrimination today is likely to be implicit and not brazenly intentional. For this reason, plaintiffs who sue fintech lenders will use
the disparate impact theory of liability upon which to base their
claims.
In recent years, some have questioned the use of impact theory in lending discrimination litigation. For instance, the question
arose in the aftermath of lawsuits the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) filed against indirect auto lenders regarding
auto loan race disparities. 64 All of these lawsuits ended with settlements. 65 But not only did several members of Congress oppose
these settlements, a 2015 House Financial Services Committee report (Junk Science I) criticized the CFPB in part for invoking "a
controversial theory of liability known as disparate impact" to support its claims against indirect lenders. 66 In a later 2016 House Financial Services Committee staff report (Junk Science II), the
63 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)
("The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation.") (discussing the disparate impact approach in the
context of employment discrimination); see also Taylor, supranote 50 at 211-14.
64 Although the conduct alleged against auto dealers actually involved the
overcharging of minorities for auto loans, the CFPB could not sue the dealers
because the Dodd-Frank Act exempted auto dealers from the regulatory supervision of the CFPB. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2012). The term "indirect auto
lenders" is the term used by the CFPB to refer to persons, such as banks and
sales finance companies, that are engaged in the business of accepting assignments of automobile retail installment contracts from dealerships. See CFPB
BULL., supra note 54, at 1-2.
65 Consent Order at 12, Ally Financial Inc., (No. 2013-CFPB-0010), 2013

CFPB Admin. Proc. LEXIS 125 at *16; Consent Order, TMX Finance LLC
(No. 2016-CFPB-0022), 2016 VFPB Admin. Proc. LEXIS 183; Consent Order
http://files.cnsumerfinance.gov/f/201602cfpb
consent-order-toyota-motorcredit-corporation.pdf; Consent Order, American Honda Finance Corp. (No.

2015-CFPB-0014), 2015 CFPB Admin. Proc. LEXIS 348 2015 CFPB Admin.
Proc. LEXIS 401; Consent Order, Fifth Third Bank (No. 2015-CFPB-0024),
2015 CFPB Admin. Proc. LEXIS 2015 CFPB Admin. Proc. LEXIS 401.
66 REPUBLICAN STAFF OF THE COMM. ON FIN. SERV., 114 CONG., UNSAFE
AT ANY BUREAUCRACY, PART II: CFPB JUNK SCIENCE AND INDIRECT AUTO

LENDING (Comm. Print 2015), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/11-24-15_cfpbindirect_autostaff report.pdf.
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CFPB was again criticized. Specifically, the report claimed that
"[i]n pursuing its ECOA enforcement agenda, the Bureau has pursued disparate impact cases without justifiable authority..."67
These objections to the use of disparate impact theory in ECOA
lending discrimination claims highlight the fundamental question
of whether disparate impact liability is cognizable under the
ECOA and is therefore an enforcement tool the law authorizes the
CFPB and other plaintiffs to use. The ECOA does not specifically
address this question, however, its implementing regulation, Regulation B, specifically proscribes discriminatory effects of lending
on consumers with ECOA protected class status.6 8 In earlier work,
I argued that the ECOA does indeed proscribe disparate impact
discrimination and I demonstrated how the pre-enactment and
post-enactment histories of the ECOA persuasively reflect the intent of Congress to allow ECOA plaintiffs to use impact methodology to prove their claims. 69 Federal courts and regulators agree
with this view. 70 On the other hand, some commentators disagree. 7 ' To date, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed this question." Of course, there is no good reason to wait
67

Id

12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b) (2018).
See Winnie F. Taylor, The ECOA andDisparateImpact Theory: A HistoricalPerspective,26 J.L. & POL'y 575 (2018).
70 See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(discussing the significance of utilization of the disparate impact theory to prove
lending discrimination claims in light of the likelihood of unintentional discrimination by lenders); see also, Francesca Lina Procaccini, Stemming the Rising
Risk of Credit Inequality: The Fairand Faithful Reading of the Equal Credit
OpportunityAct's DisparateImpact Prohibition,9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 44,
68
69

S44-45, S57 (2015); CFPB to Hold Auto Lenders Accountable for Illegal Discriminatory Markup, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 21, 2013),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financialprotection-bureau-to-hold-auto-lenders-accountable-for-illegal-discriminatorymarkup. (CFPB Bulletin providing guidance to assist lenders on how to comply
with the ECOA and thus avoid liability for disparate impact discrimination).
" See Peter N. Cubita & Michelle Hartmann, The ECOA Discrimination
Proscriptionand DisparateImpact-Interpretingthe Meaning of the Words
That Actually Are There, 61 BUs. L. 829, 830-33 (2006) (arguing that Congress
did not intend for the disparate impact method of proving discrimination claims
to apply in ECOA litigation because neither the ECOA's statutory discrimination proscription nor its legislative history supports a finding that the Act prohibits facially neutral practices that disparately affect protected class members).
7" In Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), the United States Supreme Court
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for the Court to eliminate doubt some have regarding whether disparate impact liability is a valid lending discrimination proof
method. Rather than waiting for a case to make its way to the
Supreme Court, Congress should amend the ECOA to expressly
state that disparate impact liability is a necessary antidiscrimination tool that is cognizable under this fair lending legislation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The problem of racial discrimination in a completely virtualized financial world has profound legal and social consequences
for racial minorities. This is especially true when it comes to home
and automobile purchases, the two most expensive and consequential decisions consumers make. Besides providing shelter, real
property builds equity that can be used as collateral for loans for
business, education, and other important purposes. Access to reliable transportation is crucial to getting to work, to the grocery
store, to the doctor, to school, and to childcare. 3 Together, homeownership and reliable transportation also enhance the ability of
American consumers to accumulate and transfer enormous wealth.
In the coming years, fintech's impact on the home mortgage and
auto loan markets will grow exponentially. This growth should not
impede the goal of achieving economic equality for racial minorities. To prevent such a catastrophe, it is incumbent upon policymakers to promptly develop approaches to effectively examine, analyze, and monitor fintech algorithmic credit assessment tools.
Legislation that mandates the collection of race data in financed
auto sales and states unequivocally that disparate impact claims
are cognizable under the ECOA are major steps toward eliminating racial discrimination in consumer credit. Unless and until the
problem of racial discrimination in lending is sufficiently addressed, the pervasiveness of race-based inequality in wealth will
continue to beset people of color.

decided that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act,
federal legislation enacted to combat housing discrimination. Whether the Court
will decide similarly in ECOA cases is an open question.
73 See Foohey, supranote 46.

